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Abstract 
 
We discuss how trade-in rebates can be used to manage product multigenerational innovation 
diffusion waves, and study the optimal behavior of the firm controlling the prices and rebates 
associated to product upgrades. We show how this strategy accelerates the diffusion and can lead 
to profit increments of about 5%. The strategy is profitable even when the rebate subsidizes the 
upgrades entirely. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study how to manage sales of durable new products under successive generation diffusion
waves with trade-in rebates. If the durability of the product is large relative to the introduction times
of successive generations, they cannibalize each other as firms often sell inventory of old generation goods
which were leftover from previous periods simultaneously with newer ones. The older generations are often
perceived to be of lower quality, and firms usually sell it at a reduced price (Koenigsberg, and Ferguson,
2007). Some potential customers from the old generation can upgrade to new one, but others could buy the
old one at a lower price, and this can affect a large share of customers. The innovation diffusion literature has
suggested that fear of obsolescence may cause some consumers to refuse to buy technological products from
the first generations (Cohen et al. 1996; Dhebar 1996; Venkatesh and Brown 2001), waiting for new products
and accumulate old potential buyers for new generations (Putsis 1993). Secondary markets for used durable
goods reduce consumers threat of leapfrogging, but on the other hand generate additional competition from
old products that reenter the market (Desai, Koenigsberg, and Purohit, 2007). Some companies buy-back in
second-hand markets and remanufacture the product gaining a competitive advantage (Heese et al., 2005).
Upgrade—Rebates can also be used to disable a secondhand market for the old versions, using buybacks to
retire the old units from the market (see Levinthal and Purohit, 1989).
Managing diffusion waves for successive product generations implies that marketing managers should try
to dissuade some customers to jump across successive generation waves optimally for the company profits.
In addition companies should consider some strategy to lessen the regret of consumers who have bought
old-generation products and persuade them to upgrade to new generations in the future (Dhebar 1996). In
this paper we discuss how Upgrade—Rebates (also known as trade-in rebates) can be used to reintegrate
owners of old versions of the product to the market and therefore increase current sales. An upgrade-rebate
program allows customers who own an old generation version of the product to trade it in for a product
belonging to a later generation at a discounted price. This is also an instrument to make a credible threat
that if the consumers do not buy the first generation product, they will face a relatively higher price for the
new product in subsequent generations. A successful trade-in promotion can accelerate the diffusion of first
generations.
Upgrade-rebates are implemented by companies in different industries such as software, electrical appli-
ances, cars, etc. For instance, currently Hewlett-Packard allows its customers to trade-in different types of
products and brands for its new HP products1. Xerox provides up to $600 rebate to trade in old product
of own and competitive brands for its new product models2. Similar strategies are also implemented by
Motorola and Sony, among others. Governments often adopt similar strategies. Some examples are the Car
Allowance Rebate System (CARS) program launched out by US Congress to increase automotive sales and
aid the environment and the Home Renovation Rebate in Canada in the form of a tax credit.
Trade-ins can be considered as a strategic link between reverse and direct channels management, where
the customer bears part of the reverse-logistics and the returned product is not remarketed (see Ray, Boy-
aci and Aras, 2005). Upgrade-rebates have been considered from a pricing perspective. Notice that new
customers pay more than those who upgrade an old product, and these rebates can be thought of as a
price discrimination based on consumers’ purchase history. This has been studied by Lee and Lee (1998),
Levinthal and Purohit (1989) in second hand markets and Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) in a more general
setup. Ackere and Reyniers (1995) consider quasidurable goods. But in these models the results depend
heavily on parametric assumptions, generally in a two-period framework. The rich dynamic perspective,
where upgrade-rebates are used to control the whole diffusion of successive generations, is hitherto unex-
plored. In this paper we study this problem in a context without a second-hand market, and compute the
optimal rebates policy to ride the successive diffusion waves.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is the following. In the next section we present a general
model of successive product generations diffusion, the inclusion of the upgrade-rebate program into the
benchmark model, and the optimal solution of the problem. In Section 3 we provide some simulations with
numerical solutions and results. Finally, we conclude the paper with general discussion, pointing out some
limitations and suggestions for future research.
1http://www.hp.com/united-states/tradein/home_flash.html
2http://xerox.tradeups.com/Customers/17/Default.aspx
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2 A Successive Generations Diffusion Model
In this section we present a diffusion model for successive product generations. We build up on previous
work on successive generation models, such as Norton and Bass, (1987, 1992), Mahajan and Muller (1996),
and Stremersch, Muller and Peres (2010). We first introduce the benchmark model without upgrade-rebates,
and then we discuss how the model can accommodate this type of promotion.
2.1 The Benchmark Model
Let us consider  product generations, the −  one is introduced at time   with a market potential .
After the entry of generation , the older generations    can still continue to acquire some customers
from  −1 −2 1 but more importantly, the new generation attracts natural upgraders from
the older generations −1−2 1. The expression of natural upgraders is used to point out that they
are not attracted by a promotion, but are those which would have bought the old generation had the new
generation(s) not been introduced. The model allows leapfrogging (i.e. upgrading beyond the subsequent
generation) and the specification can be easily adapted to durable and non durable products. In particular,
for non-durable products we consider sales defined as
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 ()
2 ()
...
 ()
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
11 () 0    0
12 () 22 ()    0
...
...
. . .
...
1 () 2 ()     ()
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
2
...

⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠⇔
S () = f ()0  (1)
where  = (1 )0 , and f () is a diffusion matrix with generic element  () ∈ (0 1) describing
the proportion of potential customers from  purchasing product from generation  at time  Obviously
 () is the net penetration of generation  at time  removing the upgraders. The transposed diffusion
matrix f ()0 is lower triangular to ensure that old generation products do not attract customers from the
new generations, and the elements of each column of f ()0 sum less than one (i.e., P=  () ≤ 1 for all = 1), to ensure that the summation of sales drawn from potential customers of generation  do not
exceed the potential market ceiling  It implies that P= ·  () ≤ 0 for all  = 1
This is a flexible structure, and several specifications can be considered for
·  . In particular, we consider
that the the departing rate from potential customers of generation  to purchase product generation  is
given by
·  =
( ¡ + 0 ()¢ ³1−P=  ()´   ( ) = 0  ≥ 
0    (2)
where  () = (1 ()       ()  0     0)0 is the column  of matrix f () and  is a vector with all the
coefficients equal to zero after row  meaning that the upgrading from  to  is accelerated when  is
high and when more people upgrade from old generations to  The
³
1−P=  ()´ factor ensures that
the columns of f ()0 total at most 1 at any time. Notice that we can consider more complex structures for
defections in this market, e.g. considering a generation 0, with 0 () the number of defections and a row
0 () in f ()0 accounting for the attractions from all generations to this event.
The previous model is appropriated for non-durable products so that the adopters f ()0 at time  are
the current sales (except for the defections, if they had been considered). If instead of non-durables we model
the diffusion of durable products, we can simply replace (1) by the expression
S () = ·f ()0 (3)
meaning that sales at time  are given by the change in penetration rates weighted by the market potentials.
Notice that the vector f ()0 1 is the penetration percentage of each generation at time  In both cases,
durables and non-durables, we can introduce controls on the diffusion matrix f () analogously to the Horsky
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and Simon (1983) model, or multiplicatively when these controls also affect the market potentials . Note
also that semi-durables could be handled in the benchmark setting
S () = ·f ()0+
Z 
0
·
f ()0 ∆ (− ) 
where ∆ () =  {∆ ()} is a diagonal matrix with the probabilities of a product of generation  perishing
after  periods.
2.2 The Model With an Upgrade—Rebate Program
Let us define () as the cumulative Upgrade—Rebate matrix, i.e. the element  () ∈ (0 1) is the fraction
of individuals owning a product from generation  who have upgraded it to a product of generation  by
time . The fraction of individuals upgrading at time  is ·r ()  These matrices are lower triangular, as not
all types of upgrades are pursued by the company, for example
r ()0 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0    0
12 () 0    0
...
...
. . .
...
1 () 2 ()    0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ 
if the company just allows changes from old generation purchases to new generations and not vice versa.
In practice, these matrices are often spare as just a few elements are non-zero as only upgrades between
consecutive generations are allowed, but allowing most of the old trade-up pair combinations the optimization
analysis is more flexible. Similar to the benchmark model, the elements of each column of r () sum at most
one (i.e.,
P
=+1  () ≤ 1 for all  = 1), to ensure that the summation of upgraders from generation 
to other generations does not exceed one, this implies that
P
=+1
· () ≤ 0 for  = 1 Once again this
is a flexible structure, and several specifications can be considered for
· . In particular, we can consider
that for   
· () = ¡ + 0 ()¢ ³1−P=+1  ()´ ()
 ( ) = 0
and
· () = 0 for   , where  () = ¡1 ()      (−1) ()  0     0¢0 is the column  of matrix r ()  and
 () ≥ 0 are rebates obtained on the purchase of  when the product  is returned.
The diffusion f () of the different generations will be affected by the upgrades r (). The upgrade—rebate
program also provides a response to the consumers threat of leapfrogging, and the customers who use a rebate
can also use word-of-mouth in a different way than those who do not upgrade through this promotion. In
particular we replace (2) by,
·  =
¡ + 0 () +  ()0  () ¢ ³1−P=  ()´ (1−  ()) 
for  ≥  and ·  = 0 when    with  ( ) = 0 where  is a column vector with all the coefficients
equal to zero after row   () are prices of generation , and  is a column vector with zero elements after
. For simplicity, we assume multiplicative linear prices (e.g. Dockner and Jorgensen 1988).
Next we discuss the sales behavior. Recall that f ()0 is the vector of cumulated sales from the different
generations up to time . The cumulative sales caused by the Upgrade—Rebate Program at time  are (as a
column including all generation):
r ()0 f ()0 =
Z 
0
µ
·
r ()0 f ()0+ r ()0 ·f ()0
¶

=
Z 
0
µ
f () ·r () + ·f () r ()
¶0

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(the proof is immediate as
R 
0
³
f () ·r ()
´0 = (f () r ())0−R 
0
µ ·
f () r ()
¶0
 integrating by parts).
Therefore, the instantaneous Upgrade—Rebate sales at time  is the derivative of r ()0 f ()0 which is equal
to
µ
f () ·r () + ·f () r ()
¶0
; i.e. those types of current sales are decomposed as the sum of sales to old
buyers who upgrade now
·
r ()0 f ()0, and sales of current buyers of old versions who immediately choose
to upgrade ()0 ·f ()0. In order to ban immediate upgrades some companies could consider a constrained
rebate structured with () orthogonal to ·f (), but this could be suboptimal and we will not impose it in
our basic structure.
Finally, the total sales at time  in all product generations are the sum of regular sales of the durable
products as in (3), and the second summand has sales drawn from the Upgrade—Rebate promotion
 () = ·f ()0+
µ
f () · () + ·f ()  ()
¶0

The company profits at time  are
Π () = 0
µ ·
f () + f () · () + ·f () r ()
¶
( ()−  ())
−0
µ
f ()D () · ()+ ·f ()D () r ()
¶
1
where D () is the rebates matrix and ( ()−  ()) is a vector with the unit margins for each generation
and 1 is a vector of ones.
2.3 The optimal behavior
Assuming a durable-goods monopolist who controls the diffusion of all the generations, the company profits
are obtained by maximizing:
Π =
Z ∞
0
−Π () 
=
Z ∞
0
−
µ
0
µ ·
f ()+f () · ()+ ·f () r ()
¶
( ()−  ())
− 0
µ
f ()D () ·r ()+ ·f ()D () r ()
¶
1
¶

subject to the state equations and the initial values  ( ) =  ( ) = 0 for each  ≤ .
In order to write the first-order conditions of the optimal control problem, it is convenient to write all the
state variables as vectors instead of matrices. We define
· ·    the half-vectorization3 of matrices·
f ()  ·r ()  f ()  r ()  D (), respectively; introducing a compact notation for profits and state equations,
Π = Π (  )
· =  (  ) 
· =  ( ) 
Let the Hamiltonian function  of the optimal control be given by:
 (    ) = Π (  ) +  ·  (  ) +  ·  ( ) 
3The vectorization of an × matrix , denoted by  (), is the ×1 column vector obtain by stacking the columns of
the matrix A on top of one another proceeding from column 1 to column . The half-vectorization () of a ×  matrix
 is the (+ 1)2× 1 column vector obtained by vectorizing only the lower triangular part of , i.e. staking the low-triangle
part of the columns on top of one another from column 1 to .
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where  and  be the multiplier vectors associated with the state variables  and , respectively. The
maximum principle conditions are (in compact notation)
 = 0  = 0 for any   ˙ = −  for any  ≤ ˙ = − for any   
together with initial conditions at introduction times  , and transversality conditions of   tending to
zero (numerically we equalize them to zero for large ). Also, we require that the marginal valuation of the
state variable(s) be the same evaluated before and after each   (Amit, 1986; Kamien and Schwartz, 1991).
This is a boundary value differential equation system, that must be particularized for each specific problem.
In the next sections we present some general examples and compute the numerical solutions.
3 Numerical results
In order to analyze the effect of upgrade-rebate strategy on a firm’s profits and sales, we study a monopolistic
firm which manages successive product diffusion waves. As analytical solutions of the problems are not
feasible, we solve the optimal problems numerically. We introduce several cases with increasing difficulty.
For all the examples considered, we compare the numerical results of upgrade-rebate implementation with
the benchmark case when the firm does not carry out the strategy.
3.1 Managing two generations
First we study the optimal behavior of the firm which manages the diffusion of two product generations
assuming that the monopolistic firm takes the prices of the products as given. Next, relaxing this assumption,
we examine a firm which optimally controls for prices and analyze the effect of upgrade-rebate strategy on
firm profits and product diffusion waves. Finally, we discuss the scenario, when the firm provides the second
generation product absolutely for free to the upgraders.
3.1.1 Two generations example with exogenous prices
We first present a simple case of a monopolistic firm which manages two waves of successive product genera-
tions. We assume that prices of the product generations are given exogenously. Before the second generation
is introduced, i.e. 1    2 , the state equation system is the following:
⎧
⎨
⎩
·11 = (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()) (1− 111 ()) ·12 = 0
·22 = 0 ·12 = 0
(4)
After the introduction of the second generation, 2     , the system of state equations turns to:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
·11 = (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 111 ()) ·12 = (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 122 ())·22 = (22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 22 ()) (1− 222 ())·12 = (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())1212 () 
(5)
The company profits are given by
Π =
Z ∞
0
−Π ()  =
Z 2
1
−Π1 () +
Z ∞
2
−Π2 () 
Π1 () =
·111 (1 ()− 1 ())
Π2 () =
µ
Π1 () +
µ ·121 + ·222 + 111 ·12 + ·11112¶ (2 ()− 2 ())
−
µ
111 ·12 +
·11112
¶
12 ()
¶

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The Hamiltonian conditions are given in Appendix A1. The system cannot be solved analytically. We
compute the numerical solution for the following values of the parameters. We assume arbitrary total
market sizes of 1 = 2000 and 2 = 3000 for the first and the second generation products, respectively.
We take the following values for the coefficients of innovation: 11 = 0003, 12 = 0001, and 22 = 0003;
and coefficients of imitation: 11 = 005, 12 = 005, and 22 = 005. To capture the effect of price, we
initially set 11 = 0002, 12 = 0002, 22 = 0002. We assume that 12 = 007, which is the parameter
showing how the product diffusion is affected by the proportion of upgraders through the rebate program.
For the upgraders diffusion equation we set the parameters of innovation and imitation as 12 = 003 and12 = 03, respectively; and for the parameter of the sensitivity to the rebate discounts as 12 = 00005. We
also set 1 = 300, 2 = 300, and 1 = 100, 2 = 100, i.e. the unit price and cost parameters for the first and
second generation products. The discount rate is set to  = 005. We assume that the second generation is
introduced at 2 = 65 and compute the solution for a large time length ( = 300). The results are relatively
robust when we tried other parametric values in the same ranges.
We insert the optimality conditions of the rebate strategy into eight differential equations (four equations
of state variables given by equations (4) and (5), and four equations of multipliers defined by (6) and (7)-(10)
defined before and after the introduction time of the second generation 2, respectively). We end up with
a system of 8 differential equations with 8 unknowns, with 4 initial conditions, 4 boundary conditions, as
well as continuity conditions of the state variables and the multipliers at 2. We solve the resulting BVP
numerically, using the Galerkin-Collocation method (for an introduction see, for instance, Judd 1998).
Figure 1 shows the effect of the upgrade-rebate program on the sales diffusion for this set of parameters.
From Figure 1 panel (c), the net penetration of the second generation product is significantly accelerated.
The upgrade-rebate program also speeds up the natural upgrading process from generation 1 to generation
2 (Figure 1 panel (b)). The implementation of the program would result into a faster and eventually
higher proportion of adopters buying the second generation product, but who would have bought the older
generation had the second generation product not been introduced. On the other hand, these positive effects
of the program on the sales diffusion of the second generation product is partially offset by a lower proportion
of adopters of the first generation product (see Figure 1 panel (a)).
Figure 1: effect of the upgrade-rebate program on the sales
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For this set of parameters, the optimal total discounted profit is Π = 15369 for the benchmark case and
Π = 16205 if the company implements the trade-in strategy. Thus, the implementation of trade-in strategy
increases the total discounted profits of the company by nearly 544%.
Figure 2 shows the optimal rebate amounts over time. As it can be seen, the optimal rebate strategy is
to start at a somewhat high level and to decrease it gradually over time. The comparison of the optimal
6
rebate strategy with the price value of the second generation reveals that initially for the company it is
optimal to give the buyers of the first generation monetary incentives to buy the second generation product
(i.e. 12 ()  2 up to some ).
Figure 2: Optimal rebates
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Figure 3 shows the optimal current profits (panel a) and discounted profits (panel b). Under both strategy
scenarios (i.e. implementing or not upgrade-rebate policy) optimal current profits increase over time but
after some time decline becoming closer to zero. However, when upgrade-rebate strategy is carried out,
optimal profits peak earlier and at a higher level. Not surprisingly, discounted profits asymptotically tend
to zero.
Figure 3. optimal current and discounted profits
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3.1.2 Two generation example with prices as controls
Next, we relax the assumption of exogenous prices and discuss a more realistic case of two product genera-
tions, when the firm maximizes its life-time profits optimally choosing prices and rebate amounts. We discuss
the optimal conditions of the firm’s maximization problem in the Appendix A2. We solved the system of
differential equations using the Galerkin-Collocation method used in the previous case.
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Figure 4. Effect of the upgrade-rebate program over the optimal prices
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Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the effect of the upgrade-rebate program on the diffusion of the fraction of buyers
and the optimal prices. Comparing visually Figure 4 with the case when the prices are given exogenously
(Figure 1) we observe that the diffusion acceleration effect of the program is less prominent. However, the
implementation of the program allows the company to charge higher prices for the second product generation.
On the other hand, the company charges lower prices for the first product generation so that to mitigate the
deceleration effect of the program on the fraction of buyers of the first generation product (see Figure 5).
Figure 5.Effect of the upgrade-rebate program over the diffusion
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Overall, for this set of parameters the optimal total discounted profit is Π = 16120 for the benchmark
case and Π = 16820 if the company implements the trade-in strategy. As expected, the values of optimal
total discounted profits for both scenarios are higher than the corresponding values when the prices are given
exogenously. The implementation of trade-in strategy increases the total discounted profits of the company
by nearly 434%. Interestingly, the percentage gain in profits is now less than that of the case when the
prices are exogenously given. The intuitive explanation is that by handling prices the company has more
degrees of freedom to accelerate the flows in-and-between both generations, so the effect of an additional
control (e.g., rebates) is smaller.
8
3.1.3 Two generation example, when returns-upgrades are for free
The results of the previous examples show that the upgrade-rebate program substantially increases the profits
of the firm. The program accelerates the diffusion, but also increases the total number of the buyers of the
second generation product. Thus, it is still questionable if the increase in profits of the firm is due to faster
diffusion of the sales or merely to more buyers of the second generation product.
We explore this issue by considering a situation where the firm provides the upgraders the product of the
new generation for free. Providing free upgrading is suboptimal for the firm. However, this allows us to see
if the increase of profits is due to diffusion acceleration of the second generation, as the firm does not earn
anything from those customers who upgrade.
The firm’s optimization problem is similar to that given in the first example with exogenous prices with
the exception that 12 = 2. We also abstract from the pricing strategy of the firm, assuming the prices as
given. Thus, the BVP for this scenario is given as in (4)-(10), substituting for 12 by 2.
We compute the numerical solution using the same values for the parameters. Because of space limita-
tions, we do not provide the diffusion paths of the fraction of buyers. However, we report that the diffusion
acceleration effect on the second generation product is prominent. Obviously, the optimal life-time profits are
lower for this suboptimal case than in the first example, Π = 15371 for the benchmark case and Π = 15902
when the upgrade-rebate strategy is implemented. Thus, even though the company would not earn anything
from those customers who buy the first generation product and then upgrade to the second generation, it
still faces a 345% increase in profits which is due to acceleration effect of the program.
3.2 Managing three generations
We also conduct a similar analysis for the case when the company manages diffusion waves of 3 generations
of a product. We provide the representation of the optimal control problem and its maximum principle
conditions in the Appendix A3.
We solve numerically the system of differential equations for similar values of parameters. We set the
market size of the third generation product as 3 = 3000. We take the following values for the coefficients
of innovation: 11 = 0002, 12 = 0002, 13 = 0002, 22 = 0002, 23 = 0002, 33 = 0004; and coefficients
of imitation: 11 = 003, 12 = 003, 13 = 003, 22 = 005, 23 = 005, 33 = 005. All the price sensitivity
parameters are set to  = 0002. We assume that 13 = 007, 23 = 007. For the upgraders diffusion
equation we set the parameters as  = 005,  = 01,  = 00005. Furthermore, the unit price and cost
parameters of the third generation are assumed to be equal to those of the previous generations 3 = 300
and 3 = 100, respectively. We assume that the second and the third generations are introduced at 2 = 90
and 3 = 160. The rest of the parameters of the model are assumed to be the same as in the case of the two
generations examples.
For this set of parameters the optimal total discounted profit is Π = 8509 for the benchmark case and
Π = 8331 if the company implements the trade-in strategy. The optimal discounted profits under the two
scenarios are less than in the case of two generations as innovator and imitator coefficients are smaller. The
percentage gain in profits is also less, mostly because the second and the third generations are introduced
late (at 90th and 160th period, respectively). Still, the implementation of trade-in strategy increases the
total discounted profits of the company by nearly 213%.
Figure 6 shows the effect of the program on the diffusion of the buyers’ proportions. On the one hand,
the trade-in strategy slows down the diffusion of the proportion of the buyers of the first generation product
(Figure 6 panel (a)). On the other hand, it speeds up the diffusion of the other proportions of the customers.
However, this effect is different across the proportion of buyers of second and third generations. The second
generation’s diffusion is accelerated less as some fraction of customers of the second generation trade-up
for the third generation, making the opposite effect on the acceleration of the second generation. The
upgrade-rebate program mostly affects the proportions of buyers of the third generation (13, 23, 33).
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Figure 6. Effect of the program on the diffusion
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4 Conclusion
This paper studies how to use upgrade-rebate program as a strategic tool in order to manage the diffusion
of successive product generations. Prior literature has considered upgrade-rebate program as a means to
disable second hand market of the products, to decrease the regret of customers of buying the old generation
product, to price discriminate the customers. However, most of the previous models analyze the program in
an essentially static context. This paper takes a different approach to analyze the upgrade-rebate program
in a dynamic context, where it is used to control the whole diffusion of the successive generations.
We first build a general diffusion model for successive product generations. Our model allows for leapfrog-
gers, and can be easily adopted to analyze the upgraders through the upgrade-rebate program. The model
can be applied to study the diffusion of non-durables, as well as durable products.
In order to analyze the effect of upgrade-rebate strategy, we particularize the general model for some
general examples and numerically solve them for certain sets of parameter values. For all the examples, we
demonstrate that the trade-in program accelerates the diffusion of the later generations but has the reverse
effect for the diffusion of the old generation product. In order to quantify the effect of the program, we
compute the optimal discounted profits under scenarios of implementing upgrade-rebate strategy or not. We
find that the implementation of the upgrade-rebate strategy provides a 2− 5% increase in total discounted
profits.
The size of the percentage gain in profits varies depending on several conditions. For two generations,
we demonstrate that when the firm takes the product prices as given, the gain in profits is the highest, more
than 5%. However, when the firm also controls for prices, the increase in profits is less: 434%. We show
that under trade-in strategy the firm changes its pricing policy, charging lower levels of prices of the first
and higher levels for the second generation products.
We also find that for the firm it is optimal to provide the upgraders rebate amounts even higher than the
price of the new generation up to some time. Subsidizing adopters and product giveaways have been studied
previously in the context of one product generation (e.g. Kalish and Lilien 1983, Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo
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2006). Kalish and Lilien (1983) demonstrate that mostly optimal subsidies are likely to decline over time.
Lehmann and Esteban-Bravo (2006) examine when it is optimal to give away some products to innovators in
a market consisting of two segments. In the context of two product generations, we show that even if the firm
provides the upgraders the new generation products for free, it still faces more than a 3% increase in profits.
We argue that this gain in profits is not due to more adopters of the new generation product nor to the
change in pricing strategy of the firm, but merely to the diffusion acceleration effect of the upgrade-rebate
strategy.
Most managers favor faster waves of their product generations. We show that a manager could create a
tsunami through a trade-in strategy accelerating the diffusion of later generations. Obviously, this strategy
should be carried out in parallel with other marketing mix decisions, such as pricing. A simpler implication
is that a manager could provide new generation products to the owners of the old generation, even for free,
in order to achieve rapid adoption of the new generation.
Our modeling framework has made a number of assumptions that can be relaxed to have a better
understanding of trade-in strategy in a dynamic context. For example, we assumed that the proportion of
customers who upgrade once never upgrade again in the future, i.e. rebate-upgrades are not iterated. We
can relax this assumption, albeit increasing complexity. For instance, we can allow a maximum of  iterated
rebate-upgrades, then sales for all generations are given by the vector
 () = ·f ()0+
X
=1


n
r () f ()0
o



n
r () f ()0
o
=
µ
f () ·r ()−1 + ·f () r ()
¶0

where 
n
r () f ()0
o
are sales associated to  −  iterated upgrade, and the last equality is based on
³
f () r ()
´0 = Z 
0
µ
f () ·r ()−1 + ·f () r ()
¶0

since  R 
0
³
f () ·r ()−1
´0 = ³f () r ()´0 − R 
0
µ ·
f () r ()
¶0
 But we have not dealt with this
case in the paper, i.e. we set  = 1.
Additional refinement could be considering other marketing mix variables such as advertising, and the
timing decision of product generation launch and trade-in strategies. Neither do we consider competition
for the firm from the second-hand markets. We leave these extensions for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 A1: Two generations with exogenous prices
Let  = (1 ()  2 ()  3 ()) be the multiplier vector associated with the state variables 11, 12, 22,
respectively, and  be the multiplier associated with 12. Also, let the Hamiltonian function  of the
optimal control be given by:
 =
½ 1 if 1    2
2 2   ∞
where
1 (   ) = −Π1 () + 1
·11
and
2 (   ) = −Π2 () + 1
·11 + 2
·12 + 3
·22 + 1 ·12
where  and  be the multiplier matrixes associated with the state variables  and , respectively. The
maximum principle conditions are

12 = 0
˙ = − 
˙ = −
together with initial conditions at introduction times, and transversality conditions of  and  tending
to zero (numerically we equalize them to zero for large ). Also, we require the state variables and multipliers
be continuous at 2.
Maximum Principle conditions for 1    2
As the second generation is not introduced by time 2, there is no optimality condition for the rebates.
The multiplier is obtained from the following differential equation:
˙1 = −− (11 (1− 11 ())− 11 − 1111 ()) (1− 111 ()) ¡1 (1 ()− 1 ()) + 1¢ (6)
˙2 = 0 ˙3 = 0 ˙1 = 0
Maximum Principle conditions 2    
The optimality conditions for rebate 12 yield:
0 = −111 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())12
µ
(2 ()− 2 ())− 212 () + 1

111
¶
−− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 111 ())112
12 () = 1
2
µ
(2 ()− 2 ()) + 1

111
¶
− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 111 ()) 12
211 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())12
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The state variables and multipliers are obtained from the Boundary Value Problem, consisted of the four
differential equations of the state variables and 4 differential equations of multipliers given by:
˙1 = −− (11 (1− 11 ()− 12 ())− 11 − 1111 ()) (1− 111 ())× (7)¡1 (1 ()− 1 () + 12 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ())) + 1¢
−− (1212 () (1− 11 ()− 12 ())− (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()))×
(1− 122 ()) ¡1 (2 ()− 2 ()) + 2¢
−−1212 () (1− 22 ()) (1− 222 ()) ¡2 (2 ()− 2 ()) + 3¢
−−1 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())1212 () (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ())
˙2 = − (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 111 ())× (8)¡1 (1 ()− 1 () + 12 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ())) + 1¢
−− (12 (1− 11 ()− 12 ())− (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()))×
(1− 122 ()) ¡1 (2 ()− 2 ()) + 2¢
−−12 (1− 22 ()) (1− 222 ()) ¡2 (2 ()− 2 ()) + 3¢
˙3 = 0 (9)
−−22 (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 122 ()) ¡1 (2 ()− 2 ()) + 2¢
−− (22 (1− 22 ())− (22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()))×
(1− 222 ()) ¡2 (2 ()− 2 ()) + 3¢
˙1 = −− (12 (1− 12 ())− (12 + 1212 ()))1212 ()× (10)¡111 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ()) + 1¢
−− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 111 ())1 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ())
−−1211 () (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 122 ()) ¡1 (2 ()− 2 ()) + 2¢
−−1211 () (1− 22 ()) (1− 222 ()) ¡2 (2 ()− 2 ()) + 3¢
For the benchmark scenario when the upgrade-rebate program is not implemented, the optimal control
problem is a special case where
12 () = 0 ·12 = 0 ˙1 = 0
6.2 A.2. Two generations with endogenous prices
The optimal solution of this scenario is similar to that of the case when the firm takes the prices as given.
The maximum principle conditions are
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
12 = 0

1 = 0

2 = 0
˙ = − 
˙ = −
together with initial conditions at introduction times, and transversality conditions  and  tending to
zero.
Maximum Principle conditions 1    2
The optimality condition for price is:
0 = −− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()) 111
µ
1 ()− 1 ()− (1− 111 ())11 +
1
−1
¶
We rearrange the terms to get:
1 () = 1
2
µ
1 () + 111 −
1
−1
¶
As the second generation is not introduced before 2, there is no optimality condition for rebate and
price of the second generation. The multiplier is given from the differential equation as in (6).
Maximum Principle conditions 2    
The optimality conditions for discount 12 yield:
0 = −111 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())12
µ
(2 ()− 2 ())− 212 () + 1

111
¶
−− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 111 ())112
The optimality conditions for prices are:
0 = −− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) 111 ×µ
1 ()− 1 () + 12 (2 ()− 2 ())− (1− 111 ())11 − 1212 () +
1
−1
¶
0 = −− (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) 121 ×µ
2 ()− 2 ()− (1− 122 ())12 +
2
−1
¶
−
−− (22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 22 ()) 222 ×µ
2 ()− 2 ()− (1− 222 ())22 +
3
−2
¶
−111 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())1212 ()
− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) (1− 111 ())112
We simplify the equations and represent the system as above, given three equations in matrix form as:
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Γ(1 ()  2 () 12 ())0 = Ψ, where
Γ11 = (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) 1112
Γ12 = 11 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())12
Γ13 = −211 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())12
Ψ1 = −
∙
11 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())12
µ
−2 () + 1

111
¶
− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) 12]
Γ21 = 2
Γ22 = 12
Γ23 = −12
Ψ2 = −
∙
−1 ()− 122 ()− 111 +
1
−1
¸
Γ31 = − (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) 11112
Γ32 = −2 (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()) 121
−2 (22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 22 ()) 222
Γ33 = 111 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ())12
Ψ3 = [(12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ())×
121
µ
−2 ()− 112 +
2
−1
¶
+
(22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 22 ())×
222
µ
−2 ()− 122 +
3
−2
¶
−
(11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ())112]
Using Cramer’s rule we express 1 ()  2 () 12 () in terms of the state variables and multipliers. Finally,
the optimal state variables and multipliers are obtained solving the Boundary Value Problem analogously
to the model with exogenous prices.
For the benchmark scenario when the upgrade-rebate program is not implemented, the optimal control
problem is a special case where
·12 = 012 = 0 ˙1 = 0
6.3 A.3. Three generations
We provide the solution for the case of 3 generations only for when the 3rd generation is introduced (i.e.
  3). The optimality conditions before the introduction of the 3rd generation are similar to the case of
two generations.
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For the case of 3 generations, the half-vectorization of
·
f () and ·r () matrices is the following:
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
·11 = (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 111 ()) ·12 = (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 122 ())·13 = (13 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ()))×
(1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 133 ())
·22 = (22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 222 ())·23 = (23 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ()))×
(1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 233 ())
·33 = (33 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ()))×
(1− 33 ()) (1− 333 ())
and
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
·12 = (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ()− 13 ())1212 () ·13 = (13 + 1313 () + 2323 ()) (1− 12 ()− 13 ())1313 () ·23 = (23 + 1313 () + 2323 ()) (1− 23 ())2323 ()
The company profits are:
Π =
Z ∞
0
−Π ()  =
Z ∞
0
−
µ ·111 (1 ()− 1 ())
+
µ ·121 + ·222 + 111 ·12 + ·11112¶ (2 ()− 2 ())
+
µ ·131 + ·232 + ·333 + 111 ·13 + ·11113
+(121 + 222) ·23 +
µ ·121 + ·222¶ 23¶ (3 ()− 3 ())
−
µ
111 ·12 +
·11112
¶
12 ()−
µ
111 ·13 +
·11113
¶
13 ()
−
µ
(121 + 222) ·23 +
µ ·121 + ·222¶ 23¶23 ()¶ 
Let the Hamiltonian function  of the optimal control be given by:
 (    ) = −Π () + 1
·11 + 2
·12 + 3
·13 + 4
·22 + 5
·23 + 6
·33
+1 ·12 + 2 ·13 + 3 ·23
where  and  be the multiplier matrices associated with the state variables  and , respectively. The
maximum principle conditions are

12 = 0

13 = 0

23 = 0
˙ = − 
˙ = −
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The optimality conditions for discounts 12,13,23 yield, respectively:
0 = −111 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ()− 13 ())12
µ
(2 ()− 2 ())− 212 () + 1

111
¶
−− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 111 ())112
12 () = 1
2
µ
(2 ()− 2 ()) + 1

111
¶
−(11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 111 ()) 12
211 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ()− 13 ())12
0 = −111 (13 + 1313 () + 2323 ()) (1− 12 ()− 13 ())13 ×µ
(3 ()− 3 ())− 213 () + 2
−
111
¶
−− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 111 ())113
13 () = 1
2
µ
(3 ()− 3 ()) + 2

111
¶
−(11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 111 ()) 13
211 (13 + 1313 () + 2323 ()) (1− 12 ()− 13 ())13
0 = − (121 + 222) (23 + 1313 () + 2323 ()) (1− 23 ())23 ×µ
(3 ()− 3 ())− 223 () + 3

(121 + 222)
¶
−− (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ())×
(1− 122 ())123 ()
−− (22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 22 ()− 23 ())×
(1− 222 ())223 ()
23 () = 1
2
µ
(3 ()− 3 ()) + 3

(121 + 222)
¶
−(12+1212()+2222()+1212()11())(1−11()−12()−13())(1−122())123()
2(121+222)(23+1313()+2323())(1−23())23
−(22+1212()+2222()+1212()11())(1−22()−23())(1−222())223()
2(121+222)(23+1313()+2323())(1−23())23
The state variables and multipliers are obtained from the following Boundary Value Problem:
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˙1 = −− (11 (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ())− 11 − 1111 ()) (1− 111 ())×¡1 (1 ()− 1 () + 12 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ()) + 13 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ())) + 1¢
−− (1212 () (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ())− (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()))×
(1− 122 ()) ¡1 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())) + 2¢
−− (1313 () (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ())−
(13 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ())))×
(1− 133 ()) ¡1 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 3¢
−−1212 () (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 222 ())×¡2 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())) + 4¢
−−1313 () (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 233 ()) ¡2 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 5¢
−−1313 () (1− 33 ()) (1− 333 ()) ¡3 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 6¢
−−1 (12 + 1212 ()) (1− 12 ()− 13 ())1212 () (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ())
−−1 (13 + 1313 () + 2323 ()) (1− 12 ()− 13 ())1313 () (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ())
˙2 = − (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 111 ())×¡1 (1 ()− 1 () + 12 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ()) + 13 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ())) + 1¢
−− (12 (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ())− (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()))×
(1− 122 ()) ¡1 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ())) + 2¢
−− (2323 () (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ())−
(13 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ())))×
(1− 133 ()) ¡1 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 3¢
−−12 (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 222 ())×¡2 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())) + 4¢
−−2323 () (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 233 ()) ¡2 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 5¢
−−2323 () (1− 33 ()) (1− 333 ()) ¡3 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 6¢
−−1 (23 + 1313 () + 2323 ()) (1− 23 ())2323 () (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())
˙3 = − (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 111 ())×¡1 (1 ()− 1 () + 12 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ()) + 13 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ())) + 1¢
+− (12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 122 ())×¡1 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ())) + 2¢
−− (13 (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ())−
(13 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ())))×
(1− 133 ()) ¡1 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 3¢
−−13 (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 233 ()) ¡2 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 5¢
−−13 (1− 33 ()) (1− 333 ()) ¡3 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 6¢
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˙4 = −−22 (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 122 ())×¡1 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())) + 2¢
−−2323 () (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 133 ()) ¡1 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 3¢
−− (22 (1− 22 ()− 23 ())− (22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()))×
(1− 222 ()) ¡2 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())) + 4¢
−− (2323 () (1− 22 ()− 23 ())−
(23 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ())))×
(1− 233 ()) ¡2 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 5¢
−−2323 () (1− 33 ()) (1− 333 ()) ¡3 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 6¢
−−2 (23 + 1313 () + 2323 ()) (1− 23 ())2323 () (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())
˙5 = −−23 (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 133 ()) ¡1 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 3¢
+− (22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 222 ())×¡2 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())) + 4¢
−− (23 (1− 22 ()− 23 ())−
(23 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ())))×
(1− 233 ()) ¡2 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 5¢
−−23 (1− 33 ()) (1− 333 ()) ¡3 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 6¢
˙6 = −−33 (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 133 ()) ¡1 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 3¢
−−33 (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 233 ()) ¡2 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 5¢
−− (33 (1− 33 ())−
(33 + 1313 () + 2323 () + 3333 () + 1313 () 11 () + 2323 () (12 () + 22 ())))×
(1− 333 ()) ¡3 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 6¢
˙1 = −− (12 (1− 12 ()− 13 ())− (12 + 1212 ()))1212 ()×¡111 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ()) + 1¢
+− (13 + 1313 () + 2323 ())1313 ()
¡111 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ()) + 2¢
−− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 111 ())1 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ())
−−1211 () (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 122 ())×¡1 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())) + 2¢
−−1211 () (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 222 ())×¡2 (2 ()− 2 () + 23 (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())) + 4¢
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˙2 = − (12 + 1212 ())1212 ()
¡111 (2 ()− 2 ()−12 ()) + 1¢
−− (13 (1− 12 ()− 13 ())− (13 + 1313 () + 2323 ()))1313 ()×¡111 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ()) + 2¢
−−13 (1− 23 ())2323 ()
¡
(121 + 222) (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ()) + 3
¢
−− (11 + 1111 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 111 ())1 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ())
−−1311 () (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 133 ()) ¡1 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 3¢
−−1311 () (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 233 ()) ¡2 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 5¢
−−1311 () (1− 33 ()) (1− 333 ()) ¡3 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 6¢
˙3 = −−23 (1− 12 ()− 13 ())1313 ()
¡111 (3 ()− 3 ()−13 ()) + 2¢
−− (23 (1− 23 ())− (23 + 1313 () + 2323 ()))2323 ()×¡
(121 + 222) (3 ()− 3 ()−23 ()) + 3
¢
−− ((12 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ())×
(1− 122 ())1 + (1− 222 ())2 ×
(22 + 1212 () + 2222 () + 1212 () 11 ()) (1− 22 ()− 23 ()))×
(3 ()− 3 ()−23 ())
−−23 (121 + 222) (1− 11 ()− 12 ()− 13 ()) (1− 133 ())×¡1 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 3¢
−−23 (121 + 222) (1− 22 ()− 23 ()) (1− 233 ()) ¡2 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 5¢
−−23 (121 + 222) (1− 33 ()) (1− 333 ()) ¡3 (3 ()− 3 ()) + 6¢
For the scenario when the upgrade-rebate program is not implemented, the optimal control problem is a
special case of the previous example where
·12 = 0 ·13 = 0 ·23 = 0
12 = 013 = 023 = 0
˙1 = 0 ˙2 = 0 ˙3 = 0
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